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A Death Sentence May Be Constitutional Despite
a Determination That Two of Four Special
Circumstances Found by the Jury Were Invalid:
Brown v. Sanders
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw -

DUE PROCESS OF LAw -

CRIMINAL

The United States
Supreme Court held that the jury's consideration of two invalid
special circumstances in the weighing process did not produce
constitutional error because all of the facts and circumstances
admissible to establish the two invalid eligibility factors were
properly provided under the valid special circumstances.
PROSECUTIONS -

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE -

Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884 (2006).
On Friday, January 30, 1981, Dale Boender and Janice Allen
were getting ready for dinner when they heard a knock at the
front door of their apartment. 1 Boender answered the door to find
John Cebreros and an armed Ronald Sanders. 2 Sanders and Cebreros bound and blindfolded Boender and Allen. 3 They proceeded
4
to rummage through the apartment looking for drugs and money.
Both Boender and Allen were then struck with a blunt object, and
5
Allen died as a result of the blow.
At trial, Sanders was convicted of attempted robbery, robbery,
burglary, attempted murder and murder. 6 During the sentencing
phase, the jury found true four special circumstance allegations
which allowed the jury to render a death sentence during the penalty phase. 7 The jury found that (1) the murder was committed
1. People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 566 (Cal. 1990). Boender and Allen were a couple
that had moved from Oilsdale, California, to Bakersfield, California, in 1981. Sanders, 797
P.2d at 565. Boender supported himself and Allen by selling drugs. Id.
2. Sanders, 797 P.2d at 566.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Allen suffered from a fractured skull and lacerated brain due to the blow. Id.
Boender sustained a skull fracture but was conscious when police arrived. Id.
6. Id. at 565.
7. Sanders, 797 P.2d at 565. Under the California Penal Code, "the penalty for a
defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the
state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more [of a list] of special circumstances has been found ... to be true." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 2001).
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while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery
and (2) while he was engaged in the commission of a burglary; (3)
the victim was intentionally killed to prevent her testimony regarding the burglary; and (4) the murder was especially "heinous,
atrocious and cruel."'8 Sanders was then sentenced to death during the penalty phase. 9 An automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court followed. 10
After reviewing the case, the California Supreme Court determined that two of the four special circumstances were invalid;
nonetheless, the court affirmed the trial court's sentence of
death." 1 Sanders then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, but his petition for writ of certiorari was denied. 12 Subsequently, Sanders filed a first federal petition for writ of habeas
corpus on December 20, 1993, in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California. 13 The district court ordered
him to exhaust all of his state remedies before proceeding.1 4 Once
all of his state remedies were exhausted, Sanders filed an
amended habeas corpus petition in the district court, which was
denied. 15
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a certificate
of appealability to Sanders and reviewed the case de novo.1 6 The
court of appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. 17 It concluded that the California Supreme Court failed to follow the constitutionally mandated procedures for appellate review in a weighing state where aggravating circumstances have been invalidated. 18 As a result, the court determined that Sanders's death
sentence could only be upheld by finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury's use of an invalid special circumstance was
harmless or by reweighing each of the special circumstances inde-

8. Sanders, 797 P.2d at 565. These four special circumstances fall under CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.2(a)(17), (10) and (14), respectively. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2.
9. Sanders,797 P.2d at 565.
10. Id.
ii.
Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884, 888 (2006). The California Supreme Court determined that the "heinous, atrocious and cruel" special circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. Sanders, 797 P.2d at 589. The court further held that the burglary-murder
special circumstance should be set aside. Id. at 596.
12. Sanders v. California, 500 U.S. 948 (1991).
13. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 888.
14. Sanders v. Woodford, 373 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004).
15. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Sanders, 373 F.3d at 1063.
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pendently. 19 The circuit court held that since the state courts had
failed to perform either of these tasks, Sanders's death sentence
was not individualized as required by the Constitution. 20 Thereaf21
ter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court set out to determine whether the death sentence was constitutional in light of a determination that two of the
four special factors found by the jury were invalid. 22 The Court
found that "an invalid sentencing factor . . . will render the sentence unconstitutional by reason of its adding an improper element to the aggravation scale in the weighing process unless one
of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give ag23
gravating weight to the same facts and circumstances."
Justice Scalia began the Court's analysis with a discussion of
weighing and non-weighing states. 24 Weighing states are "those
in which the only aggravating factors permitted to be considered
by the sentencer were the specified eligibility factors." 2 5 A nonweighing state is "a state that permitted the sentencer to consider
aggravating factors different from, or in addition to, the eligibility
factors. ' 26 The Court proceeded by distinguishing the process in
weighing states from that in non-weighing states. 27 In a weighing
state, the jury's consideration of an eligibility factor that is invalid
tends to tilt the balance between aggravating circumstances and
mitigating circumstances. 28 When such skewing occurs, a reversal
of the sentence is generally required. 29 However, reversal may not
be required if an appellate court either determines that such an
invalid eligibility factor was harmless or performs a reweighing of

19. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889.
20. Id.
21. Brown v. Sanders, 544 U.S. 947 (2005).
22. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 889.
23. Id. at 892.
24. Id. at 890. Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion and was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 887-88.
25. Id.
26. Id. An eligibility factor is a statutorily defined fact or situation that allows a state
to limit the class of murders to which the death penalty may be applied. Id. at 889. An
aggravating circumstance is "[a] fact or situation that relates to a criminal offense or defendant and that is considered by the court in imposing punishment," particularly death
sentences. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 259-60 (8th ed. 1999).
27. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 890.
28. Id. A mitigating circumstance is "[a] fact or situation that does not bear on the
question of a defendant's guilt but that is considered by the court in imposing punishment
and especially in lessening the severity of a sentence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (8th
ed. 1999).
29. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 890.
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the mitigating circumstances against the valid aggravating cir30
cumstances.
On the other hand, in a non-weighing state, such skewing may
not occur. 3 1 Skewing does not occur when the eligibility factors
and the aggravating factors are entirely different or when "the
aggravating factors added to the eligibility factors a category that
would allow the very facts and circumstances relevant to the invalidated eligibility factor to be weighed in aggravation under a
32
different rubric."
Accordingly, the majority explained that different rules must be
followed with regard to invalidated special circumstances in nonweighing states. 33 In a non-weighing state, there are two instances in which a jury's contemplation of an invalid special circumstance results in constitutional error. 34 In the first instance,
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment calls for the
death sentence of a defendant to be withdrawn in situations where
the invalid circumstance allowed the "jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected." 35 In the
second instance, a death sentence must be withdrawn if evidence
that would not have otherwise been heard was heard by the jury
as evidence of an invalidated eligibility factor. 36
Justice Scalia declared that in order to clarify the analysis in
weighing states, the following rule must be applied: the consideration of an invalidated sentencing factor renders a sentence unconstitutional if it adds an improper element to the aggravation scale
during the weighing process. 37 However, the sentence may be constitutional if another sentencing factor provides aggravating
38
weight to the same facts and circumstances.
Under the California Penal Code, a person convicted of firstdegree murder becomes eligible for the death penalty if any one of
the special circumstances set forth in section 190.2 is found by the
jury.3 9 Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that California is a weighing state because the jury was restricted to a weigh-

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 891.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 892.
Id.
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 892 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 2001)).
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ing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and "[was] prevented from considering evidence in aggravation other than dis40
crete, statutorily-defined factors."
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with this characterization. 41 The Court concluded that California was a nonweighing state because the "circumstances of the crime" sentencing factor provided in section 190.3 of the California Penal Code
had the effect of rendering all the special circumstances found by
42
the jury nonexclusive.
Justice Scalia went on to point out that the determination of
whether California was a weighing or non-weighing state may not
even be necessary in the present case. 43 Since all of the facts and
circumstances presented as evidence of the two invalidated factors
were also properly considered by the jury as evidence of the valid
factors, the determination of whether California was a weighing or
non-weighing state was inconsequential. 44 Specifically, the jury
found four special circumstances to be present. 45 The California
Supreme Court invalidated two of the four special circumstances. 46 That court found the burglary-murder special circumstance invalid under state merger law and the "heinous, atrocious
or cruel" special circumstance invalid because it was unconstitutionally vague. 47 However, the California Supreme Court maintained that the death sentence was proper because two of the four
special circumstances were properly considered. 48 The majority of
the United States Supreme Court agreed with the California Supreme Court's reasoning that, even though the jury considered
invalid special circumstances in the weighing process, this consideration did not produce constitutional error because the evidence
40. Id. at 893.
41. Id.
42. Id. Section 190.3 of the California Penal Code provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n
determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the following factors
if relevant: (a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the
present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.3.

43.

Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 893.

44.

Id.

45. Id. The four special circumstances determined to be applicable by the jury were
that: (1) "the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in robbery," (2) it
was "committed while the defendant was engaged in burglary of the first or second degree,"
(3) "the victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose of
preventing her testimony in any criminal proceeding" and (4) "the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel." Id.
46. Id. at 894.
47. Id.
48. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 894.
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considered by the jury to establish the invalid special circumstances was also provided to the jury for their consideration of the
"circumstances of the crime" special factor. 49
Accordingly, the majority in Brown held that the jury's consideration of invalid special circumstances did not rise to a constitutional violation, and the court of appeals was incorrect in ordering
habeas relief.50 Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals
was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceed51
ings.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens began by drawing a
distinction between weighing states and non-weighing states. 52 In
a non-weighing state, a jury's finding of an aggravating factor
53
serves only to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.
Therefore, it can be presumed that in a non-weighing state the
invalidation of one of several aggravating factors is harmless, because, e.g., the finding of four aggravating circumstances and the
finding of three aggravating circumstances have the same legal
significance, that is, making the defendant eligible for the death
penalty. On the other hand, in a weighing state, once a defendant
is eligible for the death penalty, the jury then weighs the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances to decide what particular sentence to impose on the eligible defendant. 54 Therefore, in a weighing state, four aggravating circumstances carry more weight than three aggravating circumstances. 55 Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's decision
to convert the weighing and non-weighing distinction from "one
focused on the role aggravating circumstances play in a jury's sentencing deliberations to one focused on the evidence the jury may
56
consider during those deliberations."
Justice Stevens continued, arguing that, even though the error
caused by the invalid special circumstances may have been harmless, that was not the question before the United States Supreme
Court. 57 Rather, the Court was only requested to determine

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter joined Justice Stevens in his dissenting
opinion. Id.
53. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 894-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 895.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 895-96.
57. Id.
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whether California was a weighing state. 58 Justice Stevens further contended that the Court's decision modified the law and ignored certain aspects of California's death penalty system. 59
Therefore, Justices Stevens and Souter chose not to join the majority because they believed that the majority's opinion would
complicate rather than simplify the capital sentencing jurispru60
dence.
In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the Court did
not need to decide whether California was a weighing or a nonweighing state in order to determine whether to apply "harmless
error" review.61 In the first part of his opinion, Justice Breyer set
forth the stages of a death penalty proceeding and discussed the
particulars of weighing and non-weighing states. 62 In part II, Justice Breyer illustrated how distinguishing between weighing and
non-weighing states is unnecessary for the purposes of determining whether it is appropriate to apply "harmless error" analysis in
cases where a special circumstance has been invalidated. 63 In
part III, Justice Breyer evinced a belief that a reviewing court
should be required to examine whether a jury's consideration of
invalid special circumstances was harmless in both weighing and
non-weighing states. 64 This dissenting opinion goes on in part IV
58. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 896 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the State's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, the State of California presented three questions for the Supreme Court's review. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Brown, 126 S. Ct. 884 (No. 04-980). The Court
first considered the following issue: "[i]s the California death penalty statute a 'weighing
statute' for which the state court is required to determine that the presence of an invalid
special circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the jury's determination of penalty?" Id. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition but limited its review
to this question and another unrelated issue. Brown, 544 U.S. at 947.
59. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 896 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsberg joined Justice Breyer in his five-part
dissenting opinion. Id.
62. Id. at 896-97.
63. Id. at 898. Justice Breyer illustrated this example using the following two statements:
Statement One - The judge tells the jury in a weighing State: "You can sentence the defendant to death only if you find one, or more, of the following three
aggravating circumstances, X, Y, or Z. If you do, the law requires you to consider those aggravators and weigh them against the mitigators." Statement
Two - The judge tells the jury in a non-weighing State: "You can sentence the
defendant to death only if you find one, or more, of the following three aggravating circumstances, X, Y, or Z. If you do, the law permits you to consider all
mitigating and aggravating evidence, including X, Y, and Z, in reaching your
decision."
Id. at 899. Justice Breyer contended that there was no meaningful difference between the
two statements. Id.
64. Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 902 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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to state that the majority reached a similar conclusion, namely,
that the importance of the distinction between weighing and nonweighing states should be diminished. 65 However, Justice Breyer
disagreed with the majority's belief that the need to conduct
"harmless error" review should also be diminished. 66 Finally, in
part V, Justice Breyer concluded that the distinction between
weighing and non-weighing states should be abolished, and that
the case should be remanded to the Ninth Circuit for reconsidera67
tion of the entire decision.
The death penalty may only be applied to defendants convicted
of homicide in certain circumstances. 68 In Zant v. Stephens,69 Justice Stevens declared that "statutory aggravating circumstances
play a constitutionally necessary function of ... [circumscribing]
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." 70 In most
states, such a "narrowing" requirement is met if the jury finds
that at least one aggravating factor is present. 71
The United States Supreme Court set forth this "narrowing" requirement in Furman v. Georgia.72 The Court reviewed decisions
of the Georgia Supreme Court in which African-American defendants were given the death penalty after being convicted of murder and rape, respectively. 73 The Court also reviewed a decision of
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas that affirmed the imposition of the death penalty where an African-American defendant
was convicted of rape. 74 In a per curiam opinion, the Court set out
to determine whether "the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty [in these cases] constitute[d] cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend75
ments."
In a concurring opinion in Furman,Justice Douglas stated that
capital punishment was being used against minorities, the poor
and other unpopular groups because no proper guidelines had
65. Id. at 903.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 904.
68. 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 518 (2006).
69. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
70. Zant, 462 U.S. at 878.
71. 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 519.
72. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
73. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV). A per curiam opinion is "[a]n opinion
handed down by an appellate court without identifying the individual judge who wrote the
opinion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (8th ed. 1999).
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been provided to the jury for the imposition of the death penalty.76
In order to avoid disproportionate applications of the death penalty, the Court set forth the proposition that when discretion is
afforded to a jury in death penalty sentencing, that discretion
must be limited in a manner such that the risk of arbitrary and
discriminatory sentences is minimized. 77 Therefore, it was held
that the imposition of the death penalty in these specific cases violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
78
States Constitution.
Based on the decision in Furman, many states enacted legislation in which the death penalty was applied based on whether one
or more aggravating factors or special circumstances was found by
the jury. 79 However, the issue of whether a death sentence could
stand even if a special circumstance found by the jury was determined to be invalid was not presented to the Court until 1983 in
Zant v. Stephens.8 0 In the Zant opinion, delivered by Justice Stevens, the Court held that a death sentence need not be vacated
even if one of three statutory aggravating circumstances is subse81
quently found to be invalid.
On August 19, 1974, Alpha Stephens escaped from the Houston
County Jail and proceeded to commit several burglaries, an armed
robbery and three auto thefts.8 2 On August 21, Stephens and an
accomplice were burglarizing a home when Roy Asbell encountered them.8 3 Stephens proceeded to beat and rob Asbell.8 4 Then,
along with his accomplice, he drove Asbell into Bleckley County
where they shot and killed him.8 5 Stephens was convicted of murdering Roy Asbell and was sentenced to death. 86
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the State of Georgia
requested that the jury impose the death penalty and set forth
three aggravating factors for the jury's consideration.8 7 The jury
76. Furman,408 U.S. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring).
77. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (citing Furman,408 U.S. 238).
78. Furman,408 U.S. at 239-40 (citing U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV).
79. Brown v. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884, 889 (2006).
80. 462 U.S. 862, 864 (1983).
81. Zant, 462 U.S. at 884.
82. Id. at 864-65.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 865.
86. Zant, 462 U.S. at 865.
87. Id. The three aggravating circumstances before the jury were provided in subparagraphs (b)(1), (b)(7) and (b)(9) of the Georgia capital sentencing statute. Id. Subparagraph
(b)(1) provided that "[tihe offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of
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imposed the death penalty based on their finding of the first and
third aggravating factors. 88 As the first aggravating factor rested
on two grounds, the jury actually found three aggravating factors. 89
While the case was on appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held
in another case that one of the aggravating circumstances found
by the Zant jury was unconstitutionally vague. 90 The invalidated
circumstance was that "the offense of murder was committed by a
person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions." 91 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court set
out to determine whether a death penalty "must be vacated because one of the three statutory aggravating circumstances found
by the jury was subsequently held to be invalid . . .although the
92
other two aggravating circumstances were specifically upheld."
The Court concluded that if a death sentence was supported by
even one valid aggravating circumstance, then it was improper to
set the sentence aside, notwithstanding the jury's finding that an
invalid aggravating circumstance was insufficient to support a
death sentence on its own. 93 It was determined that the jury's
finding that Stephens had a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" failed to provide a sufficient basis for
imposing the death penalty. 9 4 Justice Stevens noted that a different result could be reached in instances where evidence that
would have otherwise been inadmissible was presented to a jury
in support of an invalidated aggravating circumstance. 95 In Zant,
any evidence regarding Stephens's prior convictions was properly
provided to the jury during the sentencing hearing, and Stephens
96
was provided with the opportunity to explain these convictions.
Therefore, since two valid aggravating circumstances were found,
murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive
criminal convictions." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(1) (1978). Subparagraph (b)(7) provided that "[tihe offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim." Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(7). Subparagraph (b)(9) provided that
"[tihe offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful
custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement." Id. § 27-2534.1(b)(9).
88. Zant, 462 U.S. at 866.
89. Id. at 867.
90. Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. 1976).
91.

GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(1).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Zant, 426 U.S. at 864.
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 887.
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the death sentence was proper, even though the jury relied on a
third aggravating circumstance that was later found to be inva97
lid.
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court held in Clemons v.
Mississippi98 that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury
was not infringed when an appellate court invalidated one of several aggravating circumstances the jury found at the trial level. 99
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. 10 0 Chandler
Clemons was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to
death. 101 During the sentencing phase of the trial, the State presented evidence to the jury in the hope of establishing two aggravating factors.10 2 The first aggravating factor was that the murder was committed during a robbery, and the second aggravating
factor was that "it was an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
killing."1 0 3 On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that
the latter aggravating circumstance was unconstitutional. 10 4
However, the court upheld the death sentence because Mississippi
had an established procedure whereby a valid aggravating circumstance will support a death penalty sentence despite subse5
quent invalidation of a separate aggravating circumstance. 10
The
97. Zant, 426 U.S. at 868.
98. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
99. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 744. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that:
[iun
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

100. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 741.
101. Id. at 742. The events leading to Clemons's conviction are as follows: On April 17,
1987, Clemons decided to order a pizza and then rob the deliveryman. Id. at 741. From a
pay phone, Clemons ordered a pizza and asked that it be delivered to an apartment complex. Id. When the deliveryman arrived, an armed Clemons ordered the deliveryman,
Arthur Short, to get out of the car. Id. After robbing the deliveryman, Clemons shot and
killed him. Id.
102. Id. The aggravating factors in this case were provided in section 99-19-101 of the
Mississippi Code Annotated. Id. The relevant portions of this section of the Mississippi
Code provide that "[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: ... [t]he
capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged ...in the commission of..
•any robbery" and "[tihe capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel." MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d) and (h) (2005).
103. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 743.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine
whether the United States Constitution permits a death sentence
to be upheld if the jury that imposed the sentence relied in part on
an invalid aggravating factor.' 0 6 The Court determined that the
Constitution permits an appellate court to uphold a sentence of
death that a jury imposed while relying in part on an invalid ag-

gravating factor. 107
The holding in Clemons is distinguished from the holding in
Zant, because in Mississippi, aggravating circumstances are utilized by a jury during the actual sentencing of the defendant. 0 8
During this phase of the trial, the jury must weigh mitigating factors against aggravating factors to determine what sentence shall
be imposed. 109 However, in Georgia, aggravating factors are used
only to make a person eligible for the death penalty and not to deMississippi is considered a weighing
termine punishment. 110
state, whereas Georgia is considered a non-weighing state."'
Since Clemons was convicted in Mississippi, a weighing state, he
argued that the appellate court erred by reweighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the death sentence violated
his Eighth Amendment rights. 112
Speaking for the Court, Justice White responded that an appellate court's reweighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not unfair to a defendant such as Clemons. 113 Justice
White maintained that such reweighing produces "measured consistent application" of the death penalty." 4 The Court concluded
that even if the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances was a jury function and not an appellate function, the
Mississippi Supreme Court could find that an error which occurred during the sentencing phase was harmless. 115 Accordingly,
there are no compelling reasons why an appellate court cannot
examine the balance struck and decide whether the elimination of
an improperly considered special circumstance affects the bal106. Id. at 744.
107. Id. at 748-49.
108. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 744-45.
109. Id. at 745
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 748. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
113. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 752.
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ance. 116 In closing, Justice White noted that this opinion was not
intended to convey the idea that state appellate courts are required to engage in reweighing because of errors in the capital
sentencing procedure. 117 Instead, the Court merely decided that
such reweighing by an appellate court is constitutionally permissible. 118 In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the constitution permits an appellate court to uphold a death sentence that a
jury, relying in part on an invalid aggravating factor, has imposed."19
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court clarified the distinctions between weighing and non-weighing states with regard to
the finding of an invalid special circumstance in Stringer v.
Black.120 Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 21
James R. Stringer was found guilty of capital murder during a
robbery. 122 At the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found
three aggravating circumstances. 12 3 Upon exhausting all of his
options for relief at the state level, Stringer filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief. 124 Stringer claimed that one of the aggravating factors the jury found was so vague as to render it unconstitutional. 125 The Supreme Court proceeded to grant certio26
rari. 1
During the Court's analysis of the case, Justice Kennedy described the importance of determining whether a state is a weigh-

116. Id. at 753.
117. Id.at 754.
118. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 754.
119. Id. at 748.
120. 503 U.S. 222, 232 (1992).
121. Stringer,503 U.S. at 224.
122. Id. at 225. In June of 1982, Stringer planned and took part in a robbery. Id. During the robbery, Ray McWilliams and his wife, Nell, were shot and killed. Id. Although
Stringer did not fire the shots that killed Mr. and Mrs. McWilliams, the killings were part
of his plan for the robbery from the outset. Id.
123. Id. The aggravating factors found by the jury were as follows:
1. The Defendant contemplated that life would be taken and/or the capital
murder was intentionally committed and that the Defendant was engaged in
an attempt to commit a robbery; and was committed for pecuniary gain.
2. The capital murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing
the detection and lawful arrest of James R. Stringer, the Defendant.
3. The capital murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
Id. at 226.
124. Id. at 226.
125. Id. Stringer contended that the third aggravating factor which provided that "[tihe
capital murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" was so vague that it violated the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Id.
126. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 227.
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ing or a non-weighing state. 127 In determining whether a sentence
can be upheld in light of the use of an invalid aggravating circumstance, "the difference between weighing and non-weighing states
is not merely one of 'semantics."' 128 This difference is of critical
importance in deciding such cases.129 In a non-weighing state, the
finding of an invalid aggravating factor does not taint the process
of determining whether the death penalty is appropriate as long
as at least one aggravating circumstance remains valid, making
the defendant eligible.130 Justice Kennedy continued, stating that
the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process is not violated by the jury's finding of an invalid aggravating factor, if a
state appellate court determines that such a finding would not
have affected the jury's decision. 131
In a weighing state, when a jury is instructed to weigh an invalid aggravating factor in rendering a sentence, the appellate court
132
is unable to assume that the invalid factor made no difference.
In such instances, the weighing process performed by the jury becomes skewed. 133 There are two ways in which such skewing can
be avoided: (1) the reviewing court may perform a constitutional
"harmless error" analysis, or (2) a reweighing of the aggravating
and mitigating factors may be performed at either the trial or ap34
pellate level. 1
Therefore, due to the differences discussed above with regard to
weighing and non-weighing states, the Supreme Court held that
the same rules cannot be applied in both weighing and non35
weighing states. 1
In Tuggle v. Netherland,136 the United States Supreme Court
137
held that the rule in Zant does not apply to weighing states.
Lem Tuggle was found guilty of murder by a state court in Virginia.138 During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury sen127. Id. at 231.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 232.
130. Id.
131. Stringer,503 U.S. at 232.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 516 U.S. 10 (1995) (per curiam).
137. Tuggle, 516 U.S. at 11. The rule set forth in Zant is that "a death sentence supported by multiple aggravating circumstances need not always be set aside if one aggravator is found to be invalid." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 (1983).
138. Tuggle, 516 U.S. at 11. The events leading to Tuggle's conviction were as follows:
On June 2, 1983, a state trooper stopped a truck that Tuggle was driving and Tuggle ad-
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tenced Tuggle to death after it found that the two statutory aggravating factors had been established. 139 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the rule in Zant applied
in weighing states. 140
An important aspect of the ruling in Zant was that even after
the invalid aggravating factor was eliminated, the death sentence
still rested on two unimpeachable aggravating factors. 141 In Tuggle, however, the invalid aggravating factor prevented Tuggle
from obtaining his own psychiatric evidence to rebut the similar
evidence the State presented against him.142 Therefore, since the
State's evidence was uncontested, it was likely that the jury found
the evidence more persuasive.143 The Court went on to state that
although the rule in Zant does not require a death sentence to be
set aside due to the finding of an invalid special circumstance, the
rule does not support the proposition that "the existence of a valid
aggravator always excuses a constitutional error in the admission
44
or exclusion of evidence."1
In cases dealing with an imposition of the death penalty, a court
must take the utmost care in order to ensure that the jury has the
proper instructions to impose this penalty fairly and properly.
Since Furman, the discretion of the jury in imposing the death
penalty has been limited such that the risk of arbitrary and dismitted that he had robbed a gas station. Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1388 (4th Cir.
1996). Tuggle further told the state trooper that he was connected to a missing person's
report regarding Jessie Havens. Tuggle, 79 F.3d at 1388. Tuggle was then taken to the
sheriffs office where he told an investigator where to find Havens's body. Id. The investigator then found Havens's body where Tuggle told him it would be, and evidence procured
at the scene revealed that Tuggle had raped and killed Havens. Id.
139. Tuggle, 516 U.S. at 11-12. The capital punishment statute in Virginia involved two
stages. Id. First, the jury determined whether one or both of the aggravating factors had
been established. Id. The aggravating factors are set forth by the Virginia Code as follows:
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless [1] the Commonwealth shall
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society, or [2] that his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind or aggravated battery to the victim.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (2005). If one or both of these aggravating factors are found,
the statute requires a minimum sentence of life imprisonment, and the jury is given the
option to impose a death sentence. Tuggle, 516 U.S. at 12.
140. Tuggle, 516 U.S. at 11.
141. Id. at 12.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 13.

358

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 45

criminatory sentences is minimized. 145
Legislation has been
passed in many states that requires the jury to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances before the death penalty can be
applied.14 6 A defendant is found to be eligible for the death penalty if the jury finds that one or more aggravating factors or spe47
cial circumstances are applicable.1
However, an issue arises if one of the aggravating circumstances considered by the jury is later found to be invalid because
it is unconstitutional or in violation of a state or federal law. In
the instant case, the Supreme Court held that the jury's consideration of two invalid special circumstances in the weighing process did not produce constitutional error because all of the evidence
admissible to establish the two invalid eligibility factors was also
relevant to the valid special circumstances.148 However, as Justice
Breyer noted in his dissenting opinion, the reviewing court failed
to determine whether the jury's consideration of the two invalid
49
special circumstances was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
The majority seemed more concerned with determining whether
California should be classified as a weighing state or a nonweighing state. 150 This determination, however, is not the most
significant factor in such a case. The distinction between a weighing and a non-weighing state has little or nothing to do with the
determination of whether consideration of an invalid special circumstance constitutes harmless error. 15 1 This distinction does not
change the fact that the jury's consideration of the two invalid
special circumstances must still be considered harmless for the
52
death sentence to stand.1
While it true that an invalid special circumstance will be found
harmless in a non-weighing state more readily than in a weighing
state, this does not excuse a reviewing court from conducting a
"harmless error" analysis. 153 The reason that an invalid special
circumstance is more likely to be harmless in a non-weighing state
is because in such states the jury considers any and all aggravating factors during the sentencing phase, not just those that are
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983).
41 C.J.S. Homicide § 518 (2006).
Id.
Brown v. Sanders, 126 S. Ct. 884, 894 (2006).
Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 902 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id. at 902.
Id.
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statutorily prescibed.154 Nevertheless, in a non-weighing state, a
jury's consideration of an invalid special circumstance may be
what causes the imposition of the death penalty if "the judge or
prosecutor led [the jury] to believe that state law attaches particular importance to that factor."'155 Therefore, it is "unrealistic, impractical and legally unnecessary" to distinguish between weighing and non-weighing states to determine whether to apply "harmless-error" analysis. 156 "Harmless-error" analysis should be performed in all cases and in all states where a special circumstance
has been deemed invalid.
Since a life is in question, the deciding court must take all necessary precautions to ensure that the death penalty is properly
applied. If the possibility exists that the finding of an invalid special circumstance could render a death sentence unconstitutional,
the reviewing court must perform an analysis to determine that
the error was harmless before upholding the sentence.
As Justice Breyer stated in his dissenting opinion in Brown, "in
cases where the error is in fact harmful, [a defendant has been
deprived] of a fair and reliable sentencing proceeding."' 157 The reviewing court must not allow such an injustice to occur. Regardless of whether a state is a weighing or a non-weighing state, if a
special circumstance considered by the jury during the sentencing
phase is found to be invalid, the reviewing court must conduct
some type of "harmless error" analysis before upholding the death
penalty.
Ryan J. Miller

154.
155.
156.
157.

Brown, 126 S. Ct. at 899 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id.

